Euthyphro
By Plato
Euthyphro
By Plato
Written 380 B.C.E
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the Dialogue
SOCRATES
EUTHYPHRO
Scene
The Porch of the King Archon.
Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you
doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit
before the King, like myself?
Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
Athenians use.
Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I
cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
Soc. Certainly not.
Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?
Soc. Yes.
Euth. And who is he?
Soc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him:
his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember
his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill
grown.
Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which
he brings against you?
Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good
deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be
despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their
corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the
reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of
corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the
judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in
the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman,
he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away us who are the
destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to
the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great
public benefactor.
Euth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite
will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply
aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that
you corrupt the young?
Soc. He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing
excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent
new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his
indictment.
Euth. I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar
sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a
neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows
that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well;
for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future
to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is
true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.
Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much
consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do
not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to
others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy,
they are angry.
Euth. I am never likely to try their temper in this way.
Soc. I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom
impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to
everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the
Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would only
laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily
enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end
will be you soothsayers only can predict.
Euth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that
you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.
Soc. And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the
defendant?
Euth. I am the pursuer.
Soc. Of whom?
Euth. You will think me mad when I tell you.
Soc. Why, has the fugitive wings?
Euth. Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
Soc. Who is he?
Euth. My father.
Soc. Your father! my good man?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And of what is he accused?
Euth. Of murder, Socrates.
Soc. By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of
the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have
made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such
an action.
Euth. Indeed, Socrates, he must.
Soc. I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your
relatives-clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have
thought of prosecuting him.
Euth. I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one
who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is
the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you
ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is
whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to
let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under
the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the
man who is dead was a poor dependent of mine who worked for us as a field
labourer on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got
into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound
him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of
a diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and
took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no
great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was just what happened.
For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the
messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are
angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father.
They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, dead man was but a
murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who
prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods
think about piety and impiety.
Soc. Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of
things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be
as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious
thing in bringing an action against your father?
Euth. The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates,
from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be
good for without it?
Soc. Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple.
Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that
I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he
charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become
your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be
a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you
ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you
should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not
of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and
of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to
listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you,
I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.
Euth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am
mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more
to say to him than to me.
Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your
disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you- not even this
Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me
for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and
impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other
offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always
the same? and impiety, again- is it not always the opposite of piety, and also
the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is
impious?
Euth. To be sure, Socrates.
Soc. And what is piety, and what is impiety?
Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one
who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime-whether he be your
father or mother, or whoever he may be-that makes no difference; and not to
prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable
proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already
given to others:-of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be,
ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most
righteous of the gods?-and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos)
because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own
father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I
proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in
their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.
Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with
impiety-that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I
suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about
them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom.
What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell
me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.
Euth. Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world
is in ignorance.
Soc. And do you really believe that the gods, fought with one another,
and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may
see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them;
and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the
great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods
true, Euthyphro?
Euth. Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would
like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze
you.
Soc. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I
have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise
answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is
"piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your
father with murder.
Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.
Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other
pious acts?
Euth. There are.
Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of
piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be
pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious
impious, and the pious pious?
Euth. I remember.
Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a
standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours
or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an
action is pious, such another impious.
Euth. I will tell you, if you like.
Soc. I should very much like.
Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is
that which is not dear to them.
Soc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer
which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell,
although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
Euth. Of course.
Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or
person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is
hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one
another. Was not that said?
Euth. It was.
Soc. And well said?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and
hatreds and differences?
Euth. Yes, that was also said.
Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for
example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences
of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not
go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?
Euth. True.
Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end
the differences by measuring?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a
weighing machine?
Euth. To be sure.
Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and
which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say
the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest
that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and
unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points
about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to
decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
quarrel is such as you describe.
Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are
of a like nature?
Euth. Certainly they are.
Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil,
just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no
quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences-would there now?
Euth. You are quite right.
Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and
good, and hate the opposite of them?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and
others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings
among them.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods,
and are both hateful and dear to them?
Euth. True.
Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and
also impious?
Euth. So I should suppose.
Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered
the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what
action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by
the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising
your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but
disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but
unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences
of opinion.
Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to
the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion
about that.
Soc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one
arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
Euth. I should rather say that these are the questions which they are
always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes,
and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defence.
Soc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they
ought not to be punished?
Euth. No; they do not.
Soc. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do:
for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they
deny their guilt, do they not?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished,
but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and
when?
Euth. True.
Soc. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel
about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is
done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that
the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
Euth. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Soc. But they join issue about the particulars-gods and men alike; and,
if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question,
and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that
true?
Euth. Quite true.
Soc. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the
gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of
the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can
learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies
unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his
father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods
absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will
applaud your wisdom as long as I live.
Euth. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very dear
indeed to you.
Soc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act
is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
Euth. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good
speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I
said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the
gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of
the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful
to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these
distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also
pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to
prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and
abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that
what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what
some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our
definition of piety and impiety?
Euth. Why not, Socrates?
Soc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is
no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the
task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy,
and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to
accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you
say?
Euth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the
test of enquiry.
Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point
which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved
by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Euth. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Soc. I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we speak of
being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that
in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also in what the
difference lies?
Euth. I think that I understand.
Soc. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of
carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
Euth. No; that is the reason.
Soc. And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen?
Euth. True.
Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of
being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the
converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible;
and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action
or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of
becoming because it becomes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of
suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not
agree?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or
suffering?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of being
loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to
your definition, loved by all the gods?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
Euth. No, that is the reason.
Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a
state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is
that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different
things.
Euth. How do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledge by us to be loved
of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
Euth. Yes.
Soc. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is
loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
Euth. True.
Soc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that
which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear
to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which dear to
God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have
been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case,
and that they are quite different from one another. For one (theophiles) is of
a kind to be loved cause it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it
is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what
is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence-the
attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me
the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to
hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is,
whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not
quarrel) and what is impiety?
Euth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For
somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn
round and walk away from us.
Soc. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my
arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed because I
am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your own, you must
find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an
inclination to be on the move.
Euth. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who
sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round,
for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.
Soc. Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only made
his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the
beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of
Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them
fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself
endeavor to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I
hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then-Is not that which is
pious necessarily just?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious
all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
Euth. I do not understand you, Socrates.
Soc. And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are
younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom
makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in
understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not
mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings-
Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also
reverence. Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
Euth. By all means.
Soc. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence;
for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils,
but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of
reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of
an ill reputation.
Euth. No doubt.
Soc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also
reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But
there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended
notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number,
and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me
now?
Euth. Quite well.
Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when I asked
whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the just; and whether
there may not be justice where there is not piety; for justice is the more
extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?
Euth. No, I think that you are quite right.
Soc. Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for
instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number
the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which
represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not agree?
Euth. Yes, I quite agree.
Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety
or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or
indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature
of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
Euth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of
justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which
attends to men.
Soc. That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about
which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of
"attention"? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when
applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are
said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but
only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it not so?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
attending to horses?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman?
Euth. True.
Soc. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art
of attending to dogs?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. As the art of the ox herd is the art of attending to oxen?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to the
gods?-that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of
that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe
that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved,
are they not?
Euth. True.
Soc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by
the art of the ox herd, and all other things are tended or attended for their
good and not for their hurt?
Euth. Certainly, not for their hurt.
Soc. But for their good?
Euth. Of course.
Soc. And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the art of
attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do
a holy act you make any of the gods better?
Euth. No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
Soc. And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the
question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you did not.
Euth. You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of attention
which I mean.
Soc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which
is called piety?
Euth. It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
Soc. I understand-a sort of ministration to the gods.
Euth. Exactly.
Soc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in view
the attainment of some object-would you not say of health?
Euth. I should.
Soc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a
view to the attainment of some result?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
Soc. As there is an art which ministers to the housebuilder with a view
to the building of a house?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to
the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if,
as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in
religion.
Euth. And I speak the truth, Socrates.
Soc. Tell me then, oh tell me-what is that fair work which the gods do
by the help of our ministrations?
Euth. Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do. Soc. Why, my
friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told.
Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not
mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
Euth. Exactly.
Soc. And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the
chief or principal one?
Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things
accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is
learning, how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices.
Such piety, is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which
is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief
question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that
you are not disposed to instruct me-dearly not: else why, when we reached the
point, did you turn, aside? Had you only answered me I should have truly
learned of you by this time the-nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a
question is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads-I must
follow; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you
mean that they are a, sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
Euth. Yes, I do.
Soc. And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the
gods?
Euth. Yes, Socrates.
Soc. Upon this view, then piety is a science of asking and giving?
Euth. You understand me capitally, Socrates.
Soc. Yes, my friend; the. reason is that I am a votary of your science,
and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away
upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the
gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?
Euth. Yes, I do.
Soc. Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they
want of us. There would be no, in an art which gives to any one that which he
does not want.
Euth. Very true, Socrates.
Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing
business with one another?
Euth. That is an expression which you may use, if you like.
Soc. But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish,
however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our
gifts. There is no doubt about what they give to us; for there is no good thing
which they do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is
far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that
must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of
them.
Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods
from our gifts?
Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are
conferred by us upon the gods?
Euth. What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying,
what pleases them?
Soc. Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to
them?
Euth. I should say that nothing could be dearer.
Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the
gods?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing
firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them
walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than
Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is yourself; for the
argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not
saying that the holy or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the
gods? Have you forgotten?
Euth. I quite remember.
Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy; and
is not this the same as what is dear to them-do you see?
Euth. True.
Soc. Then either we were wrong in former assertion; or, if we were right
then, we are wrong now.
Euth. One of the two must be true.
Soc. Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry
which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat
you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the
truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must detain you, like
Proteus, until you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and
impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged
your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong
in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the
opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and
impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.
Euth. Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
Soc. Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was hoping
that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might
have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I
had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and
speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am
about to lead a better life.
THE END